



IUU Risk Intelligence

Putting Compliance First

GLOBAL EVALUATION OF FISHERIES MONITORING CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE IN 84 COUNTRIES

SOMALIA - COUNTRY REPORT

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IUU RISK INTELLIGENCE

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SUMMARY

*This evaluation of Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance report for **Somalia** is one of 84 such country evaluations that covers nations landing 92% of world's fish catch. Using a wide range of interviews and in-country consultations with both military and civilian agencies, the report exemplifies the best attempt by the author(s) at evaluation of MCS compliance using 12 questions derived from international fisheries laws. The twelve questions are divided into two evaluation fields, (MCS Infrastructure and Inspections). Complete details of the methods and results of this global evaluation would be published shortly through IUU Risk Intelligence website.*

Over a five-year period, this global assessment has been subjected to several cross-checks from both regional and global MCS experts familiar with compliance aspects in the country concerned. Uncertainty in assigning each score is depicted explicitly through score range. However, the author(s) are aware that gaps may remain for some aspects. The lead author remains open at any time to comments, and revisions will be made upon submission of evidence where necessary. Throughout the report, extreme precaution has been taken to maintain confidentiality of individuals who were willing to share information but expressed an inclination to remain anonymous out of concern for their job security, and information from such sources was cited as 'anonymous' throughout the report.

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SOMALIA – COUNTRY REPORT



FAO landings (2013): 29,800 tonnes

Fisheries contribution to GDP (2011): 2%

Law of the Sea (Ratification/accession): 24th July 1989

Coastline: 3025 km

RFMO Membership: IOTC

Patrolling agencies: Somalia Coast Guard, Puntland Coast Guard, Somaliland Coast Guard

Rank	Priority for maritime security tasks
1.	Piracy
2.	Arms & Contraband Smuggling
3.	Illegal Fishing

SECTION 1: MCS INFRASTRUCTURE

1. Does the country have adequate surveillance infrastructure (patrol aircraft, sea based patrol vessels and coastal patrols) to effectively patrol fisheries resources within its EEZ?

Score: 1

Score Range: 1-2

Low capability (IISS 2013; Scafidi 2015; Nkala 2016). Maritime law enforcement is conducted by three different administrations in Puntland, Somaliland and Mogadishu. Somali Coast Guard has modest presence off Mogadishu. Recently, Somalia received four patrol boats from Italy to beef up its coastal patrols (Anon 2017). In 2014, Somali Coast Guard received four patrol boats from Turkey to initiate patrols off Mogadishu (Anon 2014). Somaliland Government has 6 patrol boats (UNSC 2015).

There is no unified Coast Guard for the whole coastline. In terms of infrastructure, Puntland Coast Guard and Somaliland Coast Guard are far better equipped than the administration in Mogadishu. Further, large swaths of coastline off central and southern Somalia are under the control of various tribes and beyond the reach of Mogadishu based Government. Although, Combined Maritime Forces of several countries and EU-NAVFOR vessels have conducted patrols in offshore waters they target pirates and have never detained illegal fishing vessels observed within the Somali EEZ. Marine traffic picture is similarly confusing to say the least. Data on illegal fishing vessels observed by EU & other foreign navies and aircrafts during maritime patrols are not shared with Somalia, Puntland or Somaliland administrations. PMSC contractors are making the most of this situation by providing protection to both legal commercial transiting vessels and illegal fishing vessels operating in the Somali EEZ (Anon, *pers.comm.*, 2016).

2. Does the country have adequate trained officers to conduct MCS operations?

Score: 1

Score Range: 0-1

There is shortage of trained officers to conduct maritime patrols in coastal waters. There are very few fisheries inspectors. Limited training was provided by UN agencies in Puntland and Somaliland for fish catch enumeration but none have been deployed yet (Anon, *pers.comm.*, 2016).

In Somaliland, 15 officers have received training from UNODC for anti-piracy duties, interdicting illegal fishing vessels and stemming flow of weapons from Yemen (UNSC 2015).

3. Does the country have adequate management plans to monitor their fishing vessels on the high seas?

Score: 0

Score Range: 0-0

No, administrations in Somaliland, Puntland and Government in Mogadishu have very limited control on fishing vessels operating both within and beyond the EEZ. A few licenses have been issued by Government authorities in Somaliland but they limit the activities within the EEZ. Somalia has not licensed industrial fishing vessels (>24 m) to operate on the high seas.

4. What proportion of fishing vessels is equipped with vessel monitoring system (VMS) to monitor their movements on a continuous basis?

Score: 0

Score Range: 0-0

Even the foreign fishing trawlers licensed by Somaliland and Puntland are not monitored by the Somali Government. There is high level of illegal fishing by foreign fishing trawlers from Thailand, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, Taiwan, China, Korea and Europe. Fraudulent licenses are also issued by Government officials in Somaliland and Puntland. Foreign vessels with forged licenses have also been apprehended by Somaliland Forces, but such illegal vessels have never been detained by EU-NAVFOR & foreign navies patrolling Somali EEZ. Similarly, Spanish, Chinese and Taiwanese vessels pose a problem with respect to illegal tuna fishing in offshore waters (Anon, *pers.comm.*, 2016).

5. What percentage of fishing vessels (>20 m OAL) is monitored through onboard observers at sea (for major commercial fish stocks)?

Score: 0

Score Range: 0-0

Currently, there is no observer scheme in Somali fisheries. See IOTC (2015a) report for more information.

SECTION 2: INSPECTIONS

6. How often fishing vessels are inspected at sea (Identification by sight and boarding for inspections)?

Score: 1

Score Range: 1-2

Existing data suggests low capability. There are several reports of illegal fishing by foreign vessels of Asian and European origin within the Somali EEZ. See Anon (2010); Hansen (2012); IISS (2013); Glaser *et al.*, (2015); Bell *et al.*, (2017) reports for more information.

There is very limited maritime enforcement by Somaliland Coast Guard; and Somalia Coast Guard mainly target anti-piracy obligations and illegal arms trafficking. Sometimes illegal fishing boats from Yemen and Iran have been detained for illegal fishing in the Gulf of Aden. However, similar patrols are lacking for north, central and southern Somalia leading to rampant poaching by foreign trawlers in coastal waters and tuna vessels in offshore waters. Iran and Yemeni fish carrier vessels often with support from local Somali nationals also buy and collect catches from local and foreign fishing vessels operating along Somaliland. Such catches are often traded or landed in Yemen, Iran and Oman ports. Although NATO and EU-NAVFOR counter-piracy patrols encounter illegal fishing vessels, not even one vessel has been detained for illegal fishing in Somali waters, often stating that it is not within their mandate to detain such vessels (Anon, *pers.comm.*, 2016).

“A comprehensive analysis of positions indicates that many fishing vessels systematically withheld their position from authorities such as IMB [International Maritime Bureau] when attacked by pirates. It is notable that the commercial MaRisk system, basing its positions on data from recordings of the coalition fleet often collected by satellites and sensors, and seems to report that captured fishing vessels are deep within Somali economic zone when captured by pirates. The IMO-IMB logs tend to avoid reporting positions in these cases, and these sources are based on self-reporting from the fishing vessels.” (Hansen, 2011).

7. How often fishing vessels are scrutinized through aerial patrols?

Score: 0

Score Range: 0-0

Nil capability. Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu Governments do not have maritime patrol aircraft to conduct such sorties. Data on presence of illegal foreign fishing vessels may be collected by Asian and EU-NAVFOR forces but not shared with Somali Government (Anon, *pers.comm.*, 2016).

8. How often are fishing vessels inspected at landing centers and docks for foreign and domestic vessels (Dockside monitoring)?

Score: 1

Score Range: 0-1

Foreign fishing vessels generally do not land catches at Somali ports. There is no dockside inspection program due to lack of formal inspection capacity. Absence of data collection system has led to very nominal book-keeping of seafood landed in remote beaches and fishing ports. Although, some Government ministries in Puntland and Somaliland are receiving training on collection of catch data, authorities currently lack a centralized system to collect landing data by fleet types in both industrial and artisanal fisheries. Landed catch is intended for local consumption while some commercial fish are exported to Middle East and foreign markets where expensive fish command a higher price. Somali ports do not comply with the ISPS code either (Anon, *pers.comm.*, 2016).

See IOTC (2015a); Glaser *et al.*, (2015); UNDP (2005); UN reports for more information.

9. Are there adequate plans to monitor catches in coastal areas through coastal patrols (beach patrols, small-scale fishing gear and catch inspections) on a regular basis?

Score: 0

Score Range: 0-0

Data collection system is not in place. Catch inspections are not feasible due to operational constraints such as lack of vehicles, trained officers and poor internal security. There are eleven coastal regions (equivalent to provinces) that are further divided into coastal districts. FAO and Tsunami Livelihood Recovery projects provided fishing boats, gear and new cold storage facilities (incl. refrigerated trucks) enabling fishers to sell catches at higher prices but catch quantification was not part of such efforts. Illegal fishing by foreign trawlers is rampant as often witnessed by stealing & destroying of artisanal fishing gear in open daylight. Often local fishermen are helpless and overpowered at sea, as pirate trawlers carry armed security guards (Anon, *pers. comm.*, 2016).

See Hall (2016); Inoue (2012); Glaser *et al.*, (2015); IOTC (2015a); UN (2003); FNI (2003) reports for more information.

10. Are all the catches that are caught in this jurisdiction at sea accounted for (i.e., unreported Trans-shipments at sea)?

Score: 0

Score Range: 0-0

Currently, there is no monitoring to ascertain illegal transshipments taking place in the Somali EEZ. Most of the illegal tuna and other seafood taken from Somali waters is landed in neighbouring countries or transshipped to reefers on the high seas. Iran dhows, Thai & Korean trawlers and Chinese longliners are reported to land their illegal catches in ports of neighbouring countries, while most of the tuna is either landed in Seychelles or transhipped on the high seas to motherships. Tuna caught in Somali EEZ is never reported to originate from this maritime territory and often landed in foreign ports (Anon, *pers.comm.*, 2016).

11. Are vessels required to undergo inspection of equipment and fishing gear for every fishing trip?

Score: 0

Score Range: 0-0

Such measures are not reported in Somalia as authorities' lack resources to conduct such inspections.

12. Has the country taken adequate measures to revise and implement national fisheries laws to curtail illegal fishing practices; and does it comply with national and international laws signed?

Score: 1.5

Score Range: 1-2

Federal Fisheries Law of 14 December 2014 is the main national legislation for fisheries management in Somalia. The country has not adopted NPOA on IUU Fishing to fight and eliminate illegal fishing. Somalia does not have the necessary surveillance resources to curtail illegal activities occurring within its EEZ.

Somalia is not a party to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the FAO Compliance Agreement. Somalia has ratified the UN Port State Measures Agreement (Accession on November 9, 2015). See Bell *et al.*, (2017); Hall



(2016); Collins (2016); Glaser *et al.*, (2015); UNSC (2015); Scafidi (2015); Shelala (2013); Dua (2013); Weldemichael (2012); Collins (2012); Hassan (2011); Bahadur (2011); Kraska and Wilson (2009); Hansen (2011) documents for more information.

Flag of Convenience	No
Vessels on the RFMO - IUU vessel list	No

RFMO	Year of the assessment	Compliant	Partially compliant	Not Compliant	Source
IOTC	2014	Yes			IOTC (2015b)

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Note:

Bibliography and other notes relevant to this country report including methods, results and discussion for the global evaluation of 84 countries would be released shortly through IUU Risk Intelligence website (<http://iuuriskintelligence.com/>). (The author can be contacted at prammod.raju@gmail.com to provide any feedback).

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